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FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER LOCAL VOTE FRAUD
Craig C. Donsantot
During the past several years, the United States Department of
Justice has placed significant emphasis on the detection and
prosecution of electionfraud which is motivated bypolitical cor-
ruption, rather than by racialfactors. This relatively new law
enforcement interest in corruption of the franchise has, in turn,
requiredfederal courts to adress and resolve significant ques-
tions concerning the extent to which the federal Constitution and
statutes permit federal prosecutorial intervention in local electo-
ral matters. In this article the author traces the history offed-
eral prosecution of vote fraud crimes, and analyzes the current
legal theories which serve as the basis for a federal presence in
this area.
I. INTRODUCTION
The right to vote is one of the most important aspects of United
States citizenship. Its free exercise through honest elections is perhaps
the single aspect of democracy that most distinguishes our system of
government from the totalitarian and communist ideologies. Vigilant
and vigorous measures to protect the integrity of the franchise are
therefore significant priorities of the United States Department of
Justice.
Primary responsibility for establishing qualifications for the
franchise and for conducting elections is left by the Constitution to the
states.' The federal government enters this field deferentially to protect
the integrity of significant federal interests and programs and to assure
that voting rights secured by the Constitution are not willfully
abridged.
While the federal role in these matters is an emerging one, the
assertion of federal jurisdiction in this area routinely involves resort to
t A.B., Boston University, 1966; J.D., Boston University School of Law, 1969; Di-
rector, Election Crimes Branch, Public Integrity Section, United States Depart-
ment of Justice (Justice Department). The author wishes to acknowledge the
editorial assistance of Nancy S. Stewart of the Criminal Division, and of Nancy
Kabara Dowling, an associate with White, Mindel, Clarke & Hill, Towson, Mary-
land, in the preparation of this article.
t Opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and not necessarily
those of the Justice Department.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 4.
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statutes that were enacted decades ago. In addition, federal election
fraud prosecutions often entail resolution of novel questions of federal-
ism and the difficult job of enforcing federal criminal laws in the con-
text of partisan political contests.
2
Criminal laws dealing with the conduct of elections, election irreg-
ularities, and patronage abuses are scattered throughout the federal
statutes. These federal statutes fall into four groupings: (1) criminal
statutes which relate to corruption of the franchise;3 (2) criminal stat-
utes which relate to misuse of federal property, programs, or employ-
ment for political purposes;4 (3) campaign financing statutes with both
criminal and civil penalties;5 and (4) disclosure statutes for federal can-
didates and political committees.6 This article focuses on those federal
criminal statutes which relate to corruption of the franchise, and em-
phasizes those which may be employed to prosecute vote fraud in local
elections.
II. FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER ABUSE OF THE
FRANCHISE
A. History of Federal Intervention
Federal concern over the integrity of the franchise has had two
quite distinct points of focus. One has been to assure blacks and other
racial minorities the right to vote; the federal government has long
taken an extremely activist posture under the powers specifically
granted by the fifteenth amendment.7 The second has been to ensure
that general public elections are run fairly, impartially, and free from
dilution resulting from corrupt, irregular, or fraudulent practices. This
article is concerned exclusively with this second type of election abuse.
Public interest in the integrity of the franchise was first manifested
immediately after the Civil War. Between 1868 and 1870, while it was
2. Election matters are administered on a nationwide basis by the Election Crimes
Branch, a component of the Public Integrity Section of the Justice Department.
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42, 245, 592-94, 596-99 (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(c), 1973i(e)
(1976).
4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 595, 598, 604-05 (1976); 18 U.S.C. §§ 600-03, 607 (1976 & Supp.
1981).
5. 2 U.S.C. §§ 437g, 439a, 441a-441h (1976 & Supp. 1982).
6. Id §§ 431-39.
7. The Voting Rights Act provides, in part:
All citizens of the United States who are otherwise qualified by law to
vote at any election in any State, Territory, district, county, city, parish,
township, school district, municipality, or other territorial subdivision,
shall be entitled and allowed to vote at all such elections, without dis-
tinction of race, color or previous condition of servitude; any constitu-
tion, law, custom, usage, or regulation of any State or Territory, or by or
under its authority, to the contrary notwithstanding.
42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(1) (1976). Congress enacted this law in 1965 to rid the coun-
try of racial discrimination in voting. City of Port Arthur v. United States, 517 F.
Supp. 987 (D.D.C. 1981).
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enacting laws to ensure implementation of the fifteenth amendment,
Congress adopted legislation to deal with various types of electoral
abuses. Referred to as the Enforcement Act,8 this federal election
fraud law served as the basis for a relatively activist federal posture in
the investigation and prosecution of corruption of the franchise until
the 1890's when the most significant sections of it were repealed.9
The Enforcement Act had a broad jurisdictional predicate, permit-
ting it to be applied to a wide variety of corrupt election practices as
long as a federal candidate was on the ballot at the time these practices
occurred. In In re Coy,' the Supreme Court held that Congress pos-
sessed the constitutional authority to regulate any corrupt activity oc-
curring during a mixed federal/state election which exposed the federal
election to potential harm, regardless of whether that harm actually
materialized. "
Reconstruction ended as a matter of national policy in 1878, and
federal activism in election matters retrenched. A large portion of the
Enforcement Act was repealed in 1894,2 and with its demise the fed-
eral system lost most of the statutory tools which had made possible an
activist federal posture in election fraud matters. The two provisions
which survived' 3 covered only intentional deprivations of rights guar-
anteed directly by the Constitution. The constitutional philosophy pur-
sued by the courts at this time generally held that the Constitution
directly conferred a right to vote only for federal officers (i e., repre-
sentatives, senators, and the president). Therefore, electoral abuse
aimed at corrupting nonfederal contests was not judicially considered
to be prosecutable in the federal courts under federal statutes which
remained in force after most of the Enforcement Act had been
repealed. 14
In United States v. Newberry, 5 the Supreme Court aggravated this
state of affairs by holding that primary elections were not an integral
part of the official election process.' 6 Further limitations were imposed
by United States v. Bathgate,"' which read the entire subject of vote
buying out of federal criminal law, even when it was directed at cor-
8. Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 140, ch. 114 (repealed 1894).
9. See, e.g., In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731 (1888); Exparte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651
(1884); Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880).
10. 127 U.S. 731 (1888).
11. This power derives essentially from the necessary and proper clause. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See United States v. Carmichael, 685 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Malmay, 671 F.2d 869 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Bowman,
636 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1981).
12. Act of Feb. 8, 1894, 28 Stat. 36.
13. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42 (1976).
14. See United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 (1917); Guinn v. United States, 238
U.S. 347 (1915).
15. 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
16. Id at 258.
17. 246 U.S. 220 (1918).
19831
Baltimore Law Review
rupting the outcome of congressional contests.' 8
In 1941, in United States v. Classic,'9 the Supreme Court overruled
Newberry and recognized for the first time that primary elections were
a fundamental part of the election process.2" The Classic opinion rep-
resented a reversal in the judicial attitude regarding federal interven-
tion in election matters, and it signaled a new period of federal activism
in the field. Federal courts have come to recognize that the right to
vote in fairly conducted elections is a fundamental feature of United
States citizenship and, as such, is broadly protected by the Constitu-
tion.2 Federal prosecutions of election fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241
and 24222 have increased, and these two statutes have been given an
expansive interpretation where locally directed election fraud is con-
cerned.23 New criminal laws with broad jurisdictional bases have been
enacted by Congress to combat false registrations, multiple voting, and
vote buying.24 Finally, existing statutes, such as the mail fraud law
under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, have been held applicable to a wide variety of
electoral abuse.25
B. What is "Election Fraud"?
Most election fraud is easily recognized. Indeed, several especially
noxious methods of defeating the will of the electorate have been made
the subject of specific criminal statutes. Examples include vote buy-
ing,26 multiple voting, 27 and fraudulent registrations. 28 Other methods
of subverting elections, such as ballot-box stuffing, destruction of bal-
lots, falsifying tally reports, and intimidating voters, fit easily within
concepts of "fraud" that have been previously recognized as being
criminally actionable under various laws in this area.29 Other methods
18. Id at 226.
19. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
20. Id A primary election, which involves a necessary step in the choice of candi-
dates for election as representatives in Congress and which controls that choice, is
an election within the meaning of U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
21. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1965); Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 455 U.S. 937 (1982), cert. dismissed as improvidently
granted, 455 U.S. 998 (1983); Griffin v. Bums, 570 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1978);
Smith v. Cherry, 489 F.2d 1098 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1973).
22. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242 (1976); see infra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
23. United States v. Stollings, 501 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Ander-
son, 481 F.2d 685 (4th Cir. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 417 U.S. 211 (1974);
United States v. Morado, 454 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 917 (1972).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(c), (e) (1976); see United States v. Mason, 673 F.2d 737 (4th Cir.
1982); United States v. Bowman, 636 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1981).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976); see United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974); United States v. Lewis, 514 F. Supp. 169 (M.D.
Pa. 1981).
26. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
27. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
28. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Wilkins v. United States,
376 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Ryan, 99 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1938),
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of corrupting the franchise, however, are less clearly actionable. Since
the essence of the democratic franchise is the free expression of "electo-
ral will" by each voter participating in an election, any pattern of con-
duct which has as its intended effect defeating or ignoring the "electoral
will" of individual voters can generally be considered potentially ac-
tionable under the federal prosecutive theories discussed below.
C Statutes Which Implement Rights Flowing Directly from the
Constitution
1. Conspiracy Against Rights of Citizens
Section 241 was originally enacted as part of the post-Civil War
Reconstruction legislation. This statute makes it unlawful for two or
more persons to conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any
citizen in the exercise of a right or privilege secured to him by the Con-
stitution or federal laws.3 °
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the constitutionally
secured right to vote in a primary or general election for the federal
offices of representatives, senators, and the president 3' is protected by
section 241.32 Conspiracies to intentionally disrupt fair elections which
impact, directly or indirectly, on these federal contests violate the Con-
stitution, and thus section 241.
Section 241 embraces conspiracies to stuff ballot boxes with forged
ballots,33 to impersonate qualified voters,34 to alter legal ballots,35 to
fail to count votes and to alter votes counted,36 to prevent the official
count of ballots in primary elections,37 to illegally register voters and
cast absentee ballots in their names,38 and to injure, threaten, or intimi-
date voters in the exercise of their right to vote.39 It has been held that
section 241 reaches vote fraud even when the fraud does not affect the
cert. denied, 306 U.S. 635 (1939); Walker v. United States, 93 F.2d 383 (8th Cir.
1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 644 (1938); United States v. Powell, 81 F. Supp. 288
(E.D. Mo. 1948).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1976). Violations are felonies punishable by fines up to $10,000
or imprisonment up to 10 years, or both, or for any term of years or life if death
results.
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 4.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1976); see United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Exparte
Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
33. United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944).
34. Crolich v. United States, 196 F.2d 879 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 830 (1952).
35. United States v. Powell, 81 F. Supp. 288 (E.D. Mo. 1948).
36. United States v. Ryan, 99 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 635
(1939); Walker v. United States, 93 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S.
644 (1938).
37. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
38. United States v. Morado, 454 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 917 (1972);
United States v. Weston, 417 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062
(1970); Fields v. United States, 228 F.2d 544 (4th Cir. 1955).
39. Wilkens v. United States, 376 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1967).
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actual outcome of the election,4" and that the vote fraud conspiracy
need not be successful to violate this statute.4'
Section 241 reaches conduct affecting the integrity of the federal
election process as a whole. Fraudulent action with respect to, or di-
rected at, specific individual voters is not required.42 In addition, sev-
eral courts have held that section 241 does not require proof of an overt
act.43
The question that most frequently arises concerning the use of sec-
tion 241 in election fraud prosecutions involves its application to frauds
directed at local candidates when the fraud does not affect federal con-
tests. The problem arises because section 241 prohibits only conspira-
cies to deprive persons of rights actually flowing directly from the
Constitution. Many courts have speculated over the extent to which
the Constitution directly reaches or protects the right to vote for candi-
dates running for nonfederal offices.' With the exception of United
States v. Morado,45 every case that has been prosecuted under section
241 has entailed proof that the pattern of illegal activity at least conse-
quentially affected the votes tabulated in one of the federal races on the
ballot. Indeed, most of the cases prosecuted under this statute involved
specific attempts to alter the outcome of the federal race.46
Although in Anderson v. United States47 the Supreme Court was
given an opportunity to address directly the reach of the federally se-
cured franchise to nonfederal contests, it refused to do so.4 8 Conse-
quently, the use of section 241 in the area of election fraud is normally
confined to situations where the conduct in question not only took
place during an election where federal candidates were being voted
upon, but where there is also proof that a federal elective contest was at
least indirectly affected by the fraud.
An exception to this rule exists when a pattern of vote fraud affect-
ing only local contests is perpetrated through the necessary participa-
tion of state agents acting under color of law. When fraudulent state
40. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211 (1974); United States v. Morado, 454
F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 917 (1972).
41. United States v. Bradberry, 517 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1975).
42. United States v. Nathan, 238 F.2d 401 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957).
43. United States v. Morado, 454 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 406 U.S. 917 (1972);
Williams v. United States, 179 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1950), affidon other grounds, 341
U.S. 70 (1951).
44. Compare Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1965) (broad view that all rights flow
from the Constitution) with Blitz v. United States, 153 U.S. 308 (1894) (narrow
view). See also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731
(1888); Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880); United States v. Anderson, 481
F.2d 685 (4th Cir. 1973), affidon other grounds, 417 U.S. 211 (1974).
45. 454 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 917 (1972).
46. E.g., United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944); United States v. Bradberry, 517
F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1975).
47. 417 U.S. 211 (1974).
48. Id. at 213-14, 228.
[Vol. 13
Local Vote Fraud
action is present, the dilution of the vote which results violates the prin-
ciple of one-person-one-vote embodied in the fourteenth amendment.49
The intentional deprivation of this constitutional right through misus-
ing official access to ballots to commit vote fraud has been held to be
cognizable under section 241.50 Along similar lines, the use of state
authority to interfere intentionally and corruptly with the integrity of
the democratic election process may also violate the due process clause
of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.5' This theory of prosecution
under section 241 is normally used in prosecuting cases involving bal-
lot-box stuffing and the mishandling of ballots by election officials.
2. Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law
Section 242 of Title 18 of the United States Code was likewise
originally enacted as a post-Civil War Reconstruction statute. It pros-
cribes anyone acting under color of law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
or custom from willfully depriving a person of any right, privilege, or
immunity secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.
5 2
Prosecutions under section 242 need not demonstrate the existence
of a conspiracy. While the defendant must have acted illegally under
color of law, this element does not require that the accused be a dejure
officer of a governmental agency. Rather, it is sufficient that an ac-
cused had acted jointly with state agents in committing the offense,53 or
that his actions were made possible because they were clothed with the
authority of state law.54 Violations are punishable by fines up to $1,000
or imprisonment up to one year, or both, or for any term of years or for
life if death results.
55
For most purposes relevant to election frauds, section 242 can
be considered and treated as a substantive offense for conspiracies
prosecutable under section 241. As such, the cases cited in the discus-
sion of section 241 are equally relevant to this statute.56
49. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1965); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
50. United States v. Anderson, 481 F.2d 685 (4th Cir. 1973), af'd on other grounds,
417 U.S. 211 (1974); United States v. Stollings, 501 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1974).
51. Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 455 U.S. 937
(1982), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 455 U.S. 998 (1983); Gamza v.
Aguirre, 619 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1980); Griffin v. Bums, 570 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir.
1978); Smith v. Cherry, 489 F.2d 1098 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1973);
Briscoe v. Kusper, 435 F.2d 1046 (7th Cir. 1970).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976).
53. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 793-95 (1966).
54. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 97 (1951); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299 (1941).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976).
56. See supra notes 30-51 and accompanying text.
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D. Anti-Fraud Provisions of the 1965 Voting Rights Act." Fraud in
"'Mixed" Federal/Local Elections
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Act)5 7 is concerned primarily with
guaranteeing a meaningful franchise to racial minorities. The Act,
however, contains two subsections which prohibit fraudulent election
practices where corruption rather than race is the focus: 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973i(c) and 1973i(e). Unlike sections 241 and 242, these subsections
apply to fraudulent conduct which is directed at local and state elec-
tions where one or more federal candidates are on the ballot. These
provisions state that it is unlawful (1) to knowingly and willfully give
false information as to name, address, or period of residence to an elec-
tion official for the purpose of establishing one's eligibility to vote; (2)
to pay, offer to pay, or accept payment for registering to vote, or for
voting; (3) to conspire with another person to vote illegally; or (4) to
vote more than once. Violations are felonies punishable by a fine up to
$10,000 or imprisonment up to five years, or both.58
Because of their broad jurisdictional base, subsections 1973i(c) and
1973i(e) are today two of the most useful federal ballot security laws.
Indeed, these statutes are preferred in prosecuting all matters involving
corrupt disruptions of the election process that occur during elections
where federal candidates are on the ballot.
1. The Basis for Federal Jurisdiction
Unlike laws such as 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973i(c) and 1973i(e) do not implement rights that flow directly from
the Constitution. Thus, their scope is not tied to the parameters of the
"federal right to vote," whatever that concept may be. Instead, subsec-
tions 1973i(c) and 1973i(e) rest on the necessary and proper clause59 as
a measure to protect federal contests from exposure to the risk or po-
tential of corruption. Whenever the destructive elective practices that
57. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified and
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974 (1976)).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(c) (1976) provides:
Whoever knowingly or willfully gives false information as to his name,
address, or period of residence in the voting district for the purpose of
establishing his eligibility to register to vote, or conspires with another
individual for the purpose of encouraging his false registration to vote or
illegal voting, or pays or offers to pay or accepts payment either for re-
gistration to vote or for voting shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years or both: Provided, however, that
this provision shall be applicable only to general, special, or primary
elections held solely or in part for the purpose of selecting or electing
any candidate for the office of President, Vice President, presidential
elector, Member of the United States House of Representatives, Dele-
gate from the District of Columbia, Guam, or the Virgin Islands, or Res-
ident Commissioner of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
For the text of section 1973i(e), see infra note 93.
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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are described in the statutes take place at the same time as federal bal-
loting, that exposure is present.60
These provisions of the Act are useful to federal prosecutors in two
principal ways. First, they eliminate from federal election fraud cases
the need to delve into arcane questions concerning the scope of the
"federal right to vote." Second, they eliminate the need to prove that a
given pattern of otherwise corrupt conduct had an actual impact on an
elective contest protected directly by the "federal right to vote." It is
sufficient under subsections 1973i(c) and 1973i(e) that a pattern of cor-
rupt conduct occurred during a "mixed" federal/state election where
both federal and nonfederal contests were being voted upon, and that
the functional effect of the fraud exposed the federal races mentioned
in the statutes to the risk ofpotental harm. 6
In this regard, the United States Courts of Appeal for the Fourth
and Fifth Circuits have both recently affirmed the convictions of de-
fendants who had been successfully prosecuted under subsection
1973i(c) for buying votes in "mixed" federal/state elections, but whose
conduct had not been shown to have been directed at the federal con-
tests which were on the ballot involved. In United States v. Mason,62 a
defendant in South Carolina was charged with soliciting voters to ap-
ply for absentee ballots and giving them money after they handed him
their absentee ballots.63 In Mason the government argued that:
[t]he prophylactic intent of Congress is well illustrated by the
fact that the statute reaches 'offers' to pa y for voting as well as
actual payments [and that the] defendant's argument, that
some impact on a Federal race is required by statute, is whol-
ly inconsistent with the language itself since a mere 'offer' to
pay could not in itself impact on the election.6'
60. In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731 (1888); United States v. Garcia, 719 F.2d 99 (5th Cir.
1983); United States v. Carmichael, 685 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Malmay, 671 F.2d 869 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Bowman, 636 F.2d 1003
(5th Cir. 1981); see also United States v. Blanton, 77 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Mo.
1948).
61. United States v. Garcia, 719 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Carmichael,
685 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Mason, 673 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Malmay, 671 F.2d 869 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Bowman,
636 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Sayre, 522 F. Supp. 973 (W.D. Mo.
1981); United States v. Sims, 508 F. Supp. 179 (W.D. La. 1979); United States v.
Cianciulli, 482 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
62. 673 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1982).
63. None of the voters was eligible to vote absentee under state law, which permits
absentee voting only if the voter is disabled or out of the country on election day.
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-320 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
64. Brief for Appellee at 14, United States v. Mason, 673 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1982).
The United States relied on the following cases from the Fifth and Seventh Cir-
cuits: United States v. Bowman, 636 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1981) (42 U.S.C.
§ 1973i(c) prohibits any activities which have the potential to affect federal races);
United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 1077 (7th Cir. 1975) (court conceded local thrust
of illegal conduct but affirmed convictions, noting merely that the prosecution had
19831
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United States v. Carmichae6 5 involved the same vote-buying scheme as
that in Mason. The Carmichael court noted that there was a possibility
of corruption of the two federal contests because "many of the enve-
lopes containing the absentee ballots were unsealed when they were
picked up from the voters and when they were turned in .. ."I' In
United States v. Garcia,67 the Fifth Circuit upheld the conviction under
subsection 1973i(c) of a county welfare director who had purchased
votes for county officials in the 1982 Texas democratic primary by us-
ing food stamp vouchers. The only federal race on the ballot-a lop-
sided contest between the incumbent senator and an unknown
challenger-was of no interest to either the defendant or the voters
whose votes were bought.
The Eighty-ninth Congress fully intended the broad reach of sub-
section 1973i(c). As part of the 1965 Act,6 8 subsection 1973i(c) was
enacted to ensure that the integrity of the balloting process would be
secured in the setting of the expanded franchise which that Act sought
to achieve. Indeed, the original version of subsection 1973i(c) simply
prohibited irregular and corrupt practices during any election without
regard to the extent of impact on federal contests. The present statute,
by contrast, contains a jurisdictional predicate restricting its scope to
"mixed" federal/state elections when there is a potential risk to federal
balloting. The addition of this jurisdictional predicate reflected con-
gressional concern regarding the constitutionality of the unrestrictive
nature of the statute as originally proposed.69
The report which accompanied the first draft of the 1965 Act con-
tained the following observations concerning the power of Congress to
act broadly in this area:
The power of Congress to reach intimidation by private indi-
viduals in purely local elections derives from article I, section
4, and the implied power of Congress to protect Federal elec-
tions against corrupt influences. ... While article I, section
4 and the implied power of Congress to prevent corruption in
elections normally apply only to Federal elections, and Sec-
tion 1973i applies to all elections, these powers areplenary in
their scope and where intimidation is concerned it is impractical
to separate its pernicious effects between Federal and purely lo-
cal elections. 70
proven that a federal contest was on the ballot at which the pattern of conduct was
directed).
65. 685 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1982).
66. Id. at 908.
67. 719 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1983).
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 19 73-1973p (1976).
69. For a detailed discussion of the legislative history of this statute, see United States
v. Cianciulli, 482 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Pa. 1979); 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2478.
70. H.R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2437, 2462 (emphasis supplied).
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Every court that has addressed the question has specifically upheld the
constitutionality of subsection 1973i(c) as a necessary and proper exer-
cise of congressional authority.7 '
2. False Registration Information
The "false information" provision of subsection 1973i(c) reaches
any person who furnishes materially false data to a voting official to
establish eligibility to register or to vote. As it presently reads, the false
information must relate to one of the three items listed in this portion
of the statute: name, address, or period of residence in the voting dis-
trict.7 2 False information concerning other requisites to voting, such as
United States citizenship, non-felon status, mental competence and the
like, do not necessarily fall within the ambit of subsection 1973i(c).
These additional matters may be prosecuted as mail fraud provided
jurisdictional mailings are present (as frequently is the case with post
card or mail registrations).73
In virtually all electoral districts, registration to vote in the United
States is "unitary" in the sense that a single registration qualifies an
applicant to cast ballots for all local, state, and federal contests. 4
Therefore, the jurisdictional requirement that the false information at
issue have been made to establish eligibility to vote for one or more of
the federal officers named in the statute is satisfied automatically in
practically all instances where a false statement is made to place a per-
son's name on the registration rolls.75 By comparison, false data may be
furnished to poll officials on election day for the purpose of enabling a
voter to cast a ballot in a particular election. For instance, when a
voter attempts to impersonate another voter, a special showing is usu-
ally required that a federal candidate was being voted upon at the time.
In this situation, it is usually necessary to demonstrate that the course
71. United States v. Bowman, 636 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Lewin,
467 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Sayre, 522 F. Supp. 973 (W.D. Mo.
1981); United States v. Simms, 508 F. Supp. 1179 (W.D. La. 1979). Subsection
1973i(c) has been routinely upheld in its application to vote fraud schemes aimed
solely at nonfederal contests which occur in joint federal/state elections. See, e.g.,
United States v. Garcia, 719 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Carmichael,
685 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Mason, 673 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Thompson, 615 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Barker,
514 F.2d 1077 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Lewin, 467 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir.
1972); United States v. Lewis, 514 F. Supp. 169 (M.D. Pa. 1981); United States v.
Cianciulli, 482 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(c) (1976); see supra note 58.
73. E.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
909 (1974); United States v. Clapps, No. 82-172 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 1983); United
States v. Lewis, 514 F. Supp. 169 (M.D. Pa. 1981).
74. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 3-1 (1983) (registration procedure); id § I-I
("election" means primary, general, special, local, congressional, presidential, or
state-wide).
75. United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 1077 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Cianciulli,
482 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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of fraudulent conduct was functionally sufficient to expose the federal
race to potential danger.76 Isolated instances involving nothing more
than one voter impersonating another to allow him to vote for a
nonfederal candidate may be inadequate to establish federal jurisdic-
tion, even under a law that is as broadly cast as subsection 1973i(c).1
7
3. Commercialization of the Vote
Subsection 1973i(c) prohibits "vote buying" in the broadest possi-
ble terms. The statutory text covers any "payment" or "offer to pay"
that is made to a would-be voter "for voting," as well as payments that
are made to induce unregistered individuals to get onto the electoral
rolls.78 The concept of "payment" broadly embraces any medium of
exchange which possesses pecuniary value.7 9
This aspect of subsection 1973i(c) is directed at eliminating com-
mercial considerations from the voting process.8" In United States v.
Bowman, 8 the court held the statute rested on the premise that poten-
tial voters have a legitimate option to abstain from electoral participa-
tion; that those who choose to participate have a right to be protected
from the saturation of the voting process with ballots that have been
artificially stimulated through offers or gifts; and that the selection of
public officials should not degenerate into a spending contest, with the
victor being the candidate who can give the most value to the most
voters.2 With these considerations in mind, subsection 1973i(c) has
been applied to any offer or gift made for the personal benefit of a
would-be voter, for the purpose of stimulating participation in the vot-
ing process. Included are offers or gifts of money, food, food stamps,
liquor, and chances to win prizes given out in a lottery-type format.
Subsection 1973i(c), however, does not apply to rides to the polls or
time off from work, which are given to make it easier for those who
have decided to vote to do so.
83
Subsection 1973i(c) does not require that an offer or payment have
been made to influence the federal contest. Indeed, this statute does
76. See, e.g., In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731 (1888); United States v. Carmichael, 685 F.2d
903 (4th Cir. 1982).
77. See Blitz v. United States, 153 U.S. 308 (1894).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(c) (1976); see United States v. Bowman, 636 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir.
1981) (Congress may regulate any activity which exposes the federal aspects of the
election to the possibility of corruption).
79. United States v. Garcia, 719 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1983).
80. United States v. Malmay, 671 F.2d 869 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Bowman,
636 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Sayre, 522 F. Supp. 973 (W.D. Mo.
1981).
81. 636 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1981); see also United States v. Blanton, 77 F. Supp. 812,
816 (E.D. Mo. 1948).
82. United States v. Bowman, 636 F.2d 1003, 1012 (5th Cir. 1981).
83. United States v. Lewin, 467 F.2d 1132, 1136 (7th Cir. 1972) (42 U.S.C. § 1973i(c)




not even require that the payment be shown to have been made for the
purpose of influencing any particular contest. For example, in Bow-
man84 the defendant paid voters to induce them to go to the polls to
vote in a "mixed" federal/state election. Other cases have involved de-
fendants who had paid voters to cast their ballots for candidates run-
ning for sheriff,85 district judge,86 school board member,87 and county
executive officer.88 All of these cases were considered sufficient to sup-
port a conviction under subsection 1973i(c) since vote buying is a perni-
cious electoral practice which has the potential to corrupt all of the
contests occurring at the same time. Provided a pattern of vote buying
exposes federal contests to the opportunity or chance for abuse, 89 an
offense under subsection 1973i(c) is not dependent upon the identity of
the candidate or contest in which the payor is principally interested.
4. Conspiracy to Encourage Illegal Voting
Subsection 1973i(c) specifically proscribes conspiracies to en-
courage illegal voting,9" although the definition of "illegal voting" is
not given in the statute. To date, no federal prosecutions have been
brought under this clause of the statute.
Since the Constitution expressly entrusts the states with the au-
thority to establish the time, place, and manner of holding elections,
most of the standards, rules, and criteria which govern eligibility to
vote derive from state and local laws. The illegal voting clause of sub-
section 1973i(c) may apply to criminal enterprises that have as their
object registering or voting persons in conscious derogation of these
voter qualification laws. The statute's language requires that the voter
involved have been part of the conspiracy charged.9' This means that
in cases brought under this clause, the Government must prove that the
voter affected was actively aware that he was not eligible to vote and
that he was "illegally" registering or voting, or both.
84. United States v. Bowman, 636 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1981).
85. United States v. Carmichael, 685 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Ma-
son, 673 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Thompson, 615 F.2d 329 (5th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Sayre, 522 F. Supp. 973 (W.D. Mo. 1981).
86. United States v. Simms, 508 F. Supp. 1179 (W.D. La. 1981).
87. United States v. Malmay, 671 F.2d 869 (5th Cir. 1982); see also United States v.
Blanton, 77 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Mo. 1948) (mere presence of a congressional race
on the official ballot is sufficient to invoke the criminal prohibition and no show-
ing that the federal election was actually affected is necessary).
88. United States v. Garcia, 719 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1983).
89. United States v. Carmichael, 685 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1982).





5. Voting More than Once
In 1975, the 1965 Act was amended to add 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(e).92
Subsection 1973i(e) prohibits a person from voting more than once in
connection with any general, special, or primary election in which a
federal candidate is on the ballot.93 Violations are felonies punishable
by fines up to $10,000 or imprisonment up to five years, or both.
Similar to subsection 1973i(c), subsection 1973i(e) finds its consti-
tutional roots as a necessary and proper congressional enactment, di-
rected at ensuring that corrupt electoral practices are physically
isolated from elections when federal candidates may be affected
thereby. It is unnecessary to prove under subsection 1973i(e) that the
multiple vote in question actually affected a federal contest.94
Subsection 1973i(e) is a particularly useful prosecutive tool for ad-
dressing schemes to stuff ballot boxes or to cast fraudulent absentee
ballots. The concept of voting more than once, however, is not re-
stricted to those situations where one or more members of a criminal
enterprise actually marks more than one ballot. Analogous to subsec-
tion 1973i(c), subsection 1973i(e) is a broad statute95 which Congress
enacted to give "the widest possible protection to the franchise of
American citizens." 96 Therefore, subsection 1973i(e) has potential ap-
plication to situations involving intimidation of voters, or those where
it can otherwise fairly be said that a defendant purposely sought to
subvert the free exercise of electoral will by other voters, and thereby to
multiply the value of his own franchise beyond the one vote accorded
to him by the electoral system.
92. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 443 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(e) (1976)).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(e) (1976) provides:
(1) Whoever votes more than once in an election referred to in para-
graph (2) shah be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.
(2) The prohibition of this subsection applies with respect to any general,
special, or primary election held solely or in part for the purpose of se-
lecting or electing any candidate for the office of President, Vice Presi-
dent, presidential elector, Member of the United States Senate, Member
of the United States House of Representatives, Delegate from the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Guam, or the Virgin Islands, or Resident Commis-
sioner of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(3) As used in this subsection, the term 'votes more than once' does not
include the casting of an additional ballot if all prior ballots of that voter
were invalidated, nor does it include the voting in two jurisdictions
under section 1973aa- I of this title, to the extent two ballots are not cast
for an election to the same candidacy or office.
94. See United States v. Lewis, 514 F. Supp. 169 (M.D. Pa. 1981); see also United
States v. Carmichael, 685 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Mason, 673
F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Malmay, 671 F.2d 869 (5th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Sayre, 522 F. Supp. 973 (W.D. Mo. 1981).
95. United States v. Cianciulli, 482 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
96. United States v. Lewis, 514 F. Supp. 169, 178 (M.D. Pa. 1981).
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E. Other Statutory Vehicles for Achieving Federal Jurisdiction Over
Local Election Fraud
1. Mail Fraud
Even in instances where the ballot includes no candidates for fed-
eral office, a federal court may assert prosecutive jurisdiction over cor-
ruptions of the balloting process under the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 134l1.9 The mail fraud law rests on Congress' power to regulate the
mails rather than upon its authority to regulate the electoral process.
Therefore, a scheme to intentionally disrupt even a purely local elec-
tion may be reached under section 1341, provided the mails were used
in the furtherance of the fraudulent electoral objective involved.9 8
The mail fraud statute prohibits using the United States mails to
execute or further schemes to defraud. 99 Each mailing in the further-
ance of a fraudulent scheme may serve as the basis for a separate viola-
tion of section 134 1 .100
It is well settled that the concept of "scheme and artifice to de-
fraud" as used in section 1341 is to be interpreted broadly. This statute
embraces any conduct which employs deceit, trickery, misrepresenta-
tion, material omission, or breach of fiduciary duties of loyalty or
trust. ' The "fraudulent" character of a given scheme is measured by
nontechnical standards, and is not necessarily restricted by common
law concepts of false pretenses. The law places its imprimatur on so-
cially accepted moral standards, and condemns conduct which fails to
match the "reflection of moral uprightness, of fundamental honesty,
97. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1974).
98. Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916); United States v. States, 488 F.2d
761 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974); United States v. Lewis, 514
F. Supp. 169 (M.D. Pa. 1981).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976) provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraud-
ulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan,
exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for
unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or
other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be
such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such
scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or
authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to
be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom,
any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail
according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed
to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or
thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.
100. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954); Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306
(1896).
101. United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Ballard, 663
F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Pintar, 630 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Bush, 522
F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1974).
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fair play and right dealing in the general and business life of members
of society."'12
It is equally well settled that the mail fraud statute is not directed
solely at schemes that have as their objective the attainment of pecuni-
ary gain. Corrupt interference with the normal functioning of govern-
mental processes deprives a body politic of the fiduciary loyalty owed
by public servants to those they serve. Such schemes are therefore
within the ambit of section 1341.103 Similarly, schemes to deprive an
electoral body of its political rights to fair and impartially conducted
elections, free from dilution from the intentional casting and tabulation
of false, fictitious, or spurious ballots, have been held to fall within the
mail fraud statute.1°4
Most state laws require that the mails be used to cast, and often to
apply for, absentee ballots. 1°5 Thus, section 1341 is particularly useful
in prosecuting schemes to cast irregular absentee ballots. Care must be
taken, however, to avoid predicating substantive mail fraud counts on
mailings which are both required by law and which are not inherently
fraudulent. " The mailing for tabulation of absentee ballots which
have been manipulated, altered, obtained through vote buying, or
otherwise handled in violation of applicable state laws satisfies this
standard, as does the mailing of absentee ballot applications which
contain false information concerning entitlement to vote absentee, or
which have been submitted by the voter as a result of voter bribery.
Section 1341 may apply to schemes devised by purported political
fundraisers to embezzle money they have solicited for stated political
causes. In United States v. Curry,"°7 the Fifth Circuit held that a
scheme involving the intentionally false reporting of embezzled cam-
paign contributions, in derogation of state financial disclosure laws,
was properly cognizable as a criminally actionable "fraud" under sec-
102. United States v. Curry, 681 F.2d 406, 410 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Blackly v. United
States, 380 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 1967)); Gregory v. United States, 253 F.2d 104,
109 (5th Cir. 1958).
103. United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Caldwell,
544 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245 (8th Cir.
1976).
104. United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909
(1974); United States v. Lewis, 514 F. Supp. 169 (M.D. Pa. 1981); see also United
States v. Curry, 681 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1982) (dictum); United States v. Clapps,
No. 82-172 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 1983) (same). Two recent decisions from the Fifth
and Sixth Circuits have likewise approved the use of the mail fraud statute to
prosecute the casting of illegal ballots in local elections. United States v. McNee-
ley, 660 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Castle, No. 82-5011 (6th Cir.
Aug. 12, 1982). In addition, this issue is presently under consideration by the
Fourth Circuit. United States v. Odom, Nos. 83-5218 to -5220 (4th Cir. filed Sept.
6, 1983).
105. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, §§ 27-2, 27-6 (1983).
106. Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370 (1960); United States v. Curry, 681 F.2d 406,
411-13 (5th Cir. 1982).




2. Intentional Deprivation of Due Process and Equal Protection
Rights
As discussed above,' °9 a pattern of vote fraud which relies upon
the necessary participation of local election judges and poll officials to
corrupt the ballot box may be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and
242 without regard to the identity of the election or candidates af-
fected."' 0 The gravamen of offenses under these statutes is the inten-
tional deprivation of rights secured directly by the Constitution. Since
ballot fraud is by definition malum in se, the element of intent is satis-
fied whenever ballot fraud can be proved.
Several problems conceivably might arise in utilizing sections 241
and 242 to address fraud that is directed at nonfederal elections, since
the extent to which the right to vote in nonfederal elections flows di-
rectly from the Constitution is unclear. Nevertheless, when a vote
fraud scheme necessarily depends upon the participation and assistance
of persons clothed with official authority, the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fifth' and fourteenth amendments are impli-
cated. In these circumstances, the requisite constitutional predicate is
present for prosecution of locally directed vote fraud under these
statutes.
In United States v. Anderson," 2 the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
convictions of several West Virginia defendants who had focused their
energies on corrupting poll managers at a precinct in Logan County.
The object of the scheme was to affect the outcome of several local
contests that were on the ballot. While the scheme also involved a
consequential impact on two federal contests, the court concluded that
the conspiracy for which the defendants had been charged remained
"active" after the results of the federal race had been certified. It was
sufficient, ruled the court, that the defendants' conduct focused on cor-
rupting the proper discharge of the poll judges' duties, thereby impli-
cating the equal protection clause. After the Supreme Court affirmed
the case on other grounds, the Fourth Circuit in a subsequent decision,
United States v. Stollings," 3 held that an intentional deprivation of the
one-person-one-vote principle was actionable under 18 U.S.C. § 241
without regard to whether a federal contest was affected thereby.
This theory of prosecution is especially useful in prosecuting
108. Id at 414.
109. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
110. United States v. Stollings, 501 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Ander-
son, 481 F.2d 685 (4th Cir. 1973), afl'don other grounds, 417 U.S. 211 (1974).
111. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (fifth amendment due
process clause imposes equal protection guarantee on federal government); Boll-
ing v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (same).
112. 481 F.2d 685 (4th Cir. 1973), a ffdon other grounds, 417 U.S. 211 (1974).
113. 501 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1974).
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schemes to stuff ballots in nonfederal elections. Ballot box stuffing
schemes normally rely heavily on the necessary cooperation and partic-
ipation of poll officials who, by virtue of state laws, have access to and
custody of the voting machinery and paraphernalia.
III. CONCLUSION
Vote fraud represents an intentional and direct assault on one of
the institutional foundations of American democracy. Prosecution of
those who seek to disparage and corrupt the elective process is a law
enforcement priority of the federal government.
The task of federal law enforcement in this area has recently been
made substantially easier. Courts have answered the previously un-
resolved questions concerning the extent to which abuse of the
franchise aimed at local and state elections may be prosecuted under
federal law. The potential for a federal presence in this area of law
enforcement has increased accordingly. For the first time since the re-
peal of the Enforcement Act in the late 19th Century, it is accurate to
state that the federal prosecutor possesses the statutory tools through
which federal jurisdiction can be asserted over most abuses of the
franchise.
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